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Development	  of	  an	  airworthiness	  
framework	  for	  civil	  UAS	  
	  
Risk-­‐based	  approach	  towards	  the	  development	  
of	  “Part	  21”	  equivalent	  regula?ons	  for	  UAS	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•  ICAO	  Chicago	  Conven5on	  1944	  
•  Inten5on	  is	  to	  provide	  assurance	  that	  an	  aircraD	  is	  
designed,	  manufactured,	  maintained,	  and	  operated	  to	  
an	  acceptable	  standard	  by	  approved	  people	  so	  as	  not	  
present	  an	  unacceptable	  level	  of	  risk	  to	  passengers,	  
other	  aircraD,	  or	  to	  the	  people	  and	  property	  over-­‐
flown	  
•  A	  suitable	  framework	  for	  regula5ons	  governing	  the	  
airworthiness	  of	  civil	  UAS	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  defined	  
•  Exis5ng	  regula5ons	  and	  standards	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  
applicable	  to	  all	  types	  of	  UAS	  and	  there	  opera5ons	  
	  
Introduc&on	  -­‐	  Airworthiness	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•  As	  described	  by	  McGeer	  and	  Vagners	  [2]:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  …with	  a	  manned	  aircraD	  you	  have	  to	  build	  
to	  the	  same	  standard	  no	  maFer	  what	  is	  
underneath	  you,	  but	  among	  unmanned	  
aircraD,	  acceptable	  safety	  for	  flights	  
exclusively	  over	  oceans	  can	  be	  achieved	  
with	  rather	  more	  rickety	  machines	  than	  
would	  be	  fit	  to	  fly	  over	  a	  city.	  
	  
Challenges	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•  Unique	  aspects	  
	  
•  Diversity	  
Challenges	  -­‐	  Diversity	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Image:	  Ref.[1]	  
Database	  of	  UAS	  compiled	  and	  maintained	  by	  Defence	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Organisa&on	  (DSTO)	  personnel.	  Database	  includes	  military	  UAS 
	  
•  Before	  we	  can	  go	  down	  the	  path	  of	  determining	  suitable	  
standards	  and	  requirements	  for	  UAS,	  a	  suitable	  basis	  for	  
applying	  them	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  
–  E.g.,	  exis5ng	  FAR/JAR	  Part	  23	  are	  applicable	  but	  not	  to	  ALL	  UAS	  
opera5ons	  
•  We	  need	  an	  equivalent	  (in	  regulatory	  func5on)	  to	  the	  FAR/JAR	  
Part	  21	  
–  Specifies	  the	  type	  categories	  of	  conven5onally-­‐piloted	  avia5on	  
and	  the	  applicable	  cer5fica5on	  categories	  for	  each	  type	  
•  How	  do	  we	  systema5cally	  and	  jus5fiably	  describe	  the	  diversity	  
of	  UAS	  and	  their	  opera5ons	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  airworthiness	  
•  This	  can	  be	  answered	  through	  another	  ques5on:	  
–  The	  purpose	  of	  avia5on	  safety	  regula5ons	  is	  to	  ...?	  
	  
Challenges	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Risk-­‐Based	  Approach	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Type	  Categories	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Defined	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  harm	  a	  UAS	  
could	  cause	  to	  an	  area	  over-­‐flown.	  
	  
Note:	  the	  type	  categories	  are	  defined	  
independent	  of	  the	  par5cular	  area	  over-­‐
flown	  (orthogonal	  to	  the	  axis	  describing	  
the	  opera5onal	  environment)	  
	  
Opera&onal	  Environments	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Defined	  by	  the	  poten5al	  for	  harm	  given	  a	  UAS	  
crashing	  in	  the	  area	  (characterised	  by	  the	  
suscep5bility	  of	  an	  area	  to	  a	  crashing	  UAS:	  popula5on	  
density,	  degree	  of	  sheltering,	  hazardous	  industry	  etc).	  
	  
Note:	  the	  categories	  of	  opera5onal	  environment	  are	  
defined	  independent	  of	  the	  par5cular	  type	  of	  UAS	  
over-­‐flying	  (orthogonal	  to	  the	  type	  category	  axis)	  
	  
Opera&onal	  Scenarios	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Each	  cell	  of	  the	  matrix	  defines	  
a	  unique	  opera5onal	  scenario	  
(the	  combina5on	  of	  a	  UAS	  
type	  and	  par5cular	  opera5ng	  
environment).	  
	  
Assessment	  of	  the	  Risk	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The	  level	  of	  risk	  is	  determined	  for	  
each	  cell	  (opera5onal	  scenario).	  	  
	  
Assignment	  to	  Airworthiness	  
Categories	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Cells	  of	  a	  similar	  colour	  represent	  a	  
similar	  level	  of	  risk	  and	  hence	  are	  
subject	  to	  the	  same	  airworthiness	  
requirements.	  
The	  spectrum	  of	  risk	  is	  then	  ‘mapped’	  to	  a	  
finite	  and	  con5guous	  number	  of	  
cer5fica5on	  categories	  (r).	  
	  
Illustra5vely,	  this	  is	  the	  process	  of	  assigning	  
a	  finite	  number	  of	  colours	  to	  the	  cells.	  	  
	  
Risk	  Matrix	  Approach	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A	  single	  type	  category	  of	  UAS	  can	  be	  
cer5fied	  in	  a	  range	  of	  airworthiness	  
categories	  
•  Framework	  does	  not	  prescribe	  whether	  a	  safety	  target	  
or	  prescrip5ve	  code	  of	  requirements	  should	  be	  used	  
–  E.g.,	  small	  UAS	  may	  be	  more	  effec5vely	  regulated	  through	  
use	  of	  a	  safety	  target	  approach,	  larger	  UAS	  by	  prescrip5ve	  
requirements	  
•  Mi5ga5on	  strategies	  can	  be	  consistently	  managed:	  
–  Controls	  which	  reduce	  poten5al	  harm,	  likelihood,	  or	  both	  
harm	  and	  likelihood	  are	  characterised	  as	  movements	  
within	  the	  matrix	  
•  Cer5fica5on	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  combina5on	  of	  the	  
system	  and	  its	  intended	  opera5onal	  environment	  
–  Not	  just	  the	  MTOW	  of	  the	  aircraD	  
Discussion	  on	  Approach	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•  Jus5fiable	  	  
– Cer5fica5on	  categories	  are	  defined	  based	  on	  risk	  
•  Flexible	  
– A	  given	  UAS	  can	  be	  cer5fied	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
possible	  categories	  
– Chosen	  category	  can	  be	  determined	  by:	  available	  
technology,	  business	  case	  etc.	  
•  Traceable	  
– To	  the	  requirement	  for	  an	  equivalent	  level	  of	  
safety	  to	  conven5onally-­‐piloted	  avia5on	  
Advantages	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•  Necessitates	  more	  resolu5on	  in,	  and	  the	  
clarifica5on	  of,	  the	  defini5on	  of	  over-­‐flown	  
areas	  
–  Need	  for	  new	  ‘maps’	  classifying	  areas	  overflown	  
•  Can	  create	  high	  concentra5ons	  of	  UAS	  ac5vity	  
–  E.g.,	  high	  density	  corridors	  of	  UAS	  ac5vity	  in	  built	  up	  
areas	  
•  Must	  be	  quan5ta5ve	  to	  avoid	  subjec5ve	  
interpreta5on	  
–  E.g.,	  what	  is	  a	  densely	  populated	  area	  vs	  sparsely	  
populated?	  
•  More	  informa5on	  in	  Ref.	  [1]	  
Disadvantages	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Defini&on	  of	  UAS	  Type	  Categories	  
An	  objec?ve	  risk-­‐based	  approach	  for	  
categorising	  UAS	  
Copyright	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Type	  I	   Type	  II	   Type	  III	   Type	  IV	   Type	  n	  
Direc&on	  of	  increasing	  magnitude	  of	  poten&al	  loss	  
	  
•  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  proposed	  framework:	  
– A	  category	  describing	  a	  group	  of	  UAS	  which	  
present	  a	  similar	  level	  of	  harm	  to	  areas	  over-­‐
flown	  
•  I.e.,	  have	  the	  poten5al	  to	  cause	  about	  the	  same	  
amount	  of	  damage	  
•  Must	  cover	  the	  complete	  range	  of	  possible	  
types	  of	  UAS	  
Type	  Categories	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•  Use	  tradi5onal	  categories	  defined	  for	  CPA	  
– Do	  not	  cover	  the	  complete	  spectrum	  of	  UAS	  	  
– Sufficient	  resolu5on	  in	  exis5ng	  categories	  	  
– Use	  MTOW,	  propulsion	  systems	  and	  	  number	  of	  
seats	  onboard	  only	  
	  
•  Proposed	  approach	  is	  to	  two	  5ered	  
1.  Use	  threshold	  levels	  of	  harm	  
2.  The	  use	  a	  mathema5cal	  algorithm	  to	  
objec5vely	  “learn”	  discrete	  groupings	  of	  UAS	  
based	  on	  the	  measures	  of	  the	  poten5al	  harm	  
Approaches	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•  Requires:	  
–  A	  database	  of	  UAS	  	  
–  Models	  describing	  the	  measures	  of	  harm	  for	  each	  
UAS	  in	  the	  database	  
–  Threshold	  levels	  of	  harm	  
–  A	  suitable	  clustering/par55oning	  algorithm	  which	  
uses	  the	  risk	  measures	  to	  divide	  the	  database	  into	  
‘similar’	  groups	  
•  Advantages:	  
–  Subjec5vi5es	  can	  be	  iden5fied,	  characterised	  and	  in	  
some	  cases	  removed	  
–  Can	  consider	  complex	  risk	  measures	  
–  Output	  is	  a	  par55oning	  based	  on	  measures	  of	  risk	  
Proposed	  Approach	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•  Compiled	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  Air	  Vehicles	  
Division,	  Defence	  Science	  &	  Technology	  
Organisa5on	  (DSTO),	  Australian	  Department	  
of	  	  Defence	  
•  Data	  on	  over	  1,000	  civil	  and	  military	  UAS	  
•  This	  paper	  uses	  data	  on	  over	  500	  fixed	  wing	  
aircraD	  	  
– excludes	  aerial	  targets	  
Database	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Database	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•  Maximum	  Takeoff	  Weight	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  
characterise	  the	  diversity	  of	  UAS	  and	  the	  risk	  they	  
pose	  to	  people	  and	  property	  on	  the	  ground	  
–  E.g.,	  light-­‐weight	  slow	  mover	  vs	  light-­‐weight	  fast	  mover	  
•  Given	  an	  impact	  in	  a	  populated	  region	  
–  is	  a	  par?cular	  UAS	  capable	  of	  inflic?ng	  harm	  to	  different	  
types	  of	  people	  on	  the	  ground?	  
–  Injury	  to	  people	  standing	  in	  the	  open	  
–  Injury	  to	  people	  sheltered	  within	  light	  structures	  
–  Injury	  to	  people	  sheltered	  within	  heavy	  structures	  
•  Simple	  energy	  model	  is	  used	  (maximum	  kine5c	  
energy)	  
Measures	  –	  Individual	  Risk	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Thresholds	  –	  Individual	  Risk	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Output	  –	  Individual	  Risk	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Insufficient	  resolu&on	  in	  the	  fourth	  category.	  
Problem	  -­‐	  	  How	  to	  further	  objec<vely	  discriminate	  
between	  these	  UAS?	  
	  
•  Illustra5ve	  energy	  model	  chosen	  is	  very	  conserva5ve	  (in-­‐
frangible),	  second	  order	  model	  is	  needed:	  
–  Momentum	  and	  energy	  dissipa5on	  
	  	  
•  Secondary	  effects	  are	  not	  considered	  
–  Explosions,	  collapsing	  buildings,	  fragmenta5on	  etc	  
•  Only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  categories	  (4)	  can	  be	  iden5fied	  
–  Large	  “fourth”	  category	  (5	  orders	  of	  magnitude)	  which	  are	  
‘lethal’	  to	  ‘everything’	  
	  
•  KE	  on	  its	  own	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  comprehensively	  
characterise	  the	  risk	  
–  Does	  not	  consider	  the	  ‘group’	  risk	  –the	  poten5al	  to	  injure	  
more	  than	  one	  individual	  	  
Limita&ons	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•  Group	  risk	  discriminates	  between	  UAS	  based	  
on	  the	  poten5al	  for	  harm	  to	  mul5ple	  people	  	  
•  Simple	  lethal	  area	  and	  uniform	  distribu5on	  of	  
energy	  model	  is	  used	  
•  Problem	  -­‐	  How	  to	  ‘objec5vely’	  sub-­‐divide	  
large	  fourth	  category	  of	  UAS	  based	  on	  group	  
risk?	  
– Clustering	  algoritm	  
Measures	  –	  Group	  Risk	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•  K-­‐means	  clustering	  algorithm	  ayempts	  to	  
form	  K	  clusters	  by	  minimising	  a	  distance	  
metric	  
•  Must	  specify	  K	  
	  
Clustering	  Algorithm	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Raw	  data	  to	  be	  grouped	   Two	  clusters	   Three	  clusters	  
	  
	  
Results	  –	  Clustering	  







RQ-­‐14A	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Summary	  –	  Type	  Categories	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Type 
Category 
Boundary conditions Example UAS 
1 KEmax  < 42 J Black Widow, Hornet 
2 42 J ≤  KEmax < 1,356 J Pointer, Raven 
3 1,356 J ≤ KEmax < 13,560 J ScanEagle, Aerosonde Mk4 
4 13,560 J ≤ KEmax  Iarea < 347 m2 Shadow 600 
5 347 m2 ≤  Iarea Heron 1, Taranis, Global Hawk 
•  Type	  categories	  are	  defined	  by:	  
– Threshold	  levels	  of	  harm	  to	  individuals	  
– Applica5on	  of	  a	  clustering	  algorithm	  using	  
measures	  of	  the	  harm	  to	  groups	  of	  people	  
•  Approach	  iden5fied	  five	  type	  categories	  of	  
UAS	  
– Limita5ons	  in	  the	  models	  used	  
– Results	  would	  only	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  
discussion	  
•  Commercial,	  poli5cal,	  technological,	  social	  and	  other	  
influencing	  factors	  
Discussion	  –	  Type	  Categories	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•  Paper	  covered:	  
– Defini5on	  of	  airworthiness	  regulatory	  structure	  
– Defini5on	  of	  UAS	  type	  categories	  
•  Approach	  
– Risk	  based	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•  Specifying	  the	  opera5onal	  areas	  
•  Quan5fying	  the	  equivalent	  level	  of	  safety	  
objec5ve	  and	  mapping	  to	  cer5fica5on	  
categories	  
•  Regulatory	  impact	  analysis	  
•  Extension	  to	  airspace	  integra5on	  regula5ons	  
Future	  Work	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